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Abstract
New wave public health places an emphasis on exhorting individuals to engage in healthy behaviour with good 
health being a signifier of virtuous moral standing, whereas poor health is often associated with personal moral 
failings. In effect, the medical is increasingly being collapsed into the moral. This approach is consistent with 
other aspects of contemporary neoliberal governance, but it fuels moral panics and creates folk devils. We 
explore the implications and dysfunctional consequences of this new wave of public health policy in the context 
of the latest moral panic around obesity. 
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The Medical and the Moral
Since it emerged as an organised endeavour across western 
societies in the 19th century, public health has shifted focus a 
number of times. Initially it represented a collective response 
to advances in scientific knowledge about the sources and 
spread of infectious diseases, then the predominant cause of 
death. The emphasis was on large scale public programmes to 
improve hygiene, sanitation and air quality. While the pioneer 
sanitary reformers were motivated by a wish to reduce 
infectious disease and to harness the advances of science they 
were also motivated by a strong moral commitment, inspired 
for many by a Christian ethos, to promote the well-being of 
the populous.1 Deaths from infectious diseases in England and 
Wales dropped from 25.9% of all deaths in 1911 to 0.7% of all 
deaths in 2013.2 The predominant cause of death by the mid-
20th century was non-communicable disease. In 1971, 50% of 
all deaths were from heart disease, this rate dropped to around 
28% by 2013.2 This drop can be attributed to improvements in 
treatment and also to a focus on addressing causes of death, 
including via a smoking ban in all enclosed work spaces which 
was introduced in England in 2007. Deaths from cancer have 
risen throughout the 20th century, 6% in 1911, 29% in 2013, 
but these deaths characteristically now occur later in life. This 
shift in the patterns of death has occurred at the same time as 
increasing life-expectancy.2
This changing pattern of disease is reflected in a shift 
in public health policy. During the last decades of the 20th 
century the focus moved to one that sought to combat physical 
inactivity, smoking, alcohol consumption and poor diet. These 
were seen as modifiable risk factors, if these risk factors could 
be reduced there would be less non-communicable disease 
later in life. In the 21st century, while the focus has remained 
on addressing things that are seen as causal factors of non-
communicable disease, the emphasis has shifted towards 
programmes which seek to promote personal responsibility, 
with individuals required to exercise self-discipline in the 
areas health professionals define as high risk. Individuals are 
exhorted to engage in healthy behaviour with good health 
being a signifier of virtuous moral standing, whereas poor 
health is associated with personal moral failings.3 
This shift from a collective moral commitment, evidenced 
in public works programmes, via a combination of legal and 
behavioural change to a concern with the moral failings of 
those who are seen as putting their health at risk has occurred 
at the same time as a shift in the role of the state in healthcare, 
within a broader shift in the nature of government. These are 
shifts that have been well-documented within the neoliberal 
governmentality literature,4,5 with recent extensions exploring 
the role of pastoral power in promoting adherent patient 
subjectivities.6 According to Foucault7 the logic of neoliberal 
governmentality is to “to extend the rationality of the market, 
the schemes of analysis it proposes, and the decision-
making criteria it suggests to areas that are not exclusively 
or not primarily economic” (p. 79). It identifies dispersed 
mechanisms and technologies of power. Some power is still 
“old fashioned” sovereign power of command, in public 
health this might be banning or taxing something or offering 
inducements to encourage desired actions. But some power 
is now disciplinary power and this is concerned with the 
formation of motives, desires and character in individuals. 
The effect it seeks is that “disciplined” individuals acquire the 
habits, capacities and skills that allow them to act in socially 
appropriate ways without the need for the exercise of external 
coercive power.8 But those individuals who do not act in a 
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disciplined way find that their subsequent encounters with 
health services involve their being given communicative 
messages at whose core is social and moral opprobrium for 
making poor lifestyle choices. Those that make poor choices 
are stigmatised and a moral distance is created between the 
well-behaved and the miscreants who are behaving badly. 
In effect the medical is increasingly being collapsed into 
the moral.9 There are three main consequences of this. The 
first is one of “dissolving the bonds of social solidarity”10 as 
a denuded sense of citizenship is created in those subjected 
to moral distancing.11,12 The second concerns the way 
moral distance allows the state to step aside from what had 
previously been seen as part of its welfare responsibilities. A 
new quasi-state welfare apparatus emerges which is designed 
to outsource welfare and, in so doing, reduce the welfare bill. 
The third consequence is that a shift to the moral does not 
work, it does not take cognizance of biological, structural 
and social causation and it misreads what motivates choice in 
individuals. We will explore this analytic weakness in relation 
to obesity below. 
If a moral distance from those seen to not be accepting 
personal responsibility for their behavior is created the next 
step is to portray those so distanced as a risk not just to 
themselves but to others. That risk is not the contagion, and 
the need for segregation to prevent the spread of disease from 
the few to the many, that the early public health exponents 
were concerned with but a risk to the economic well-being 
of the favored citizenry, those whose behavior is seen as 
appropriately disciplined. 
Beck13 has argued that there is a new form of modernity 
which he terms “risk society.” Such a society has a systematic 
way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and 
introduced by modernization. Beck argues that people 
occupy social risk positions and that knowledge allows you 
to act to mitigate your own risks. Acting becomes a way of 
virtue signalling, and not mitigating your risk position makes 
you a “dangerous outsider.” The sorts of horizontal division 
in society that this creates can be looked at using the analytic 
construct of moral panics. 
Mods and Rockers Ride Again
The social theory of moral panic was first introduced by 
Stanley Cohen in his book Folk Devils and Moral Panics.14 The 
book focused on public reaction to clashes between two rival 
youth subculture groups, “mods” and “rockers,” in 1964 over 
public holiday weekends at beaches in Southern England. On 
the basis of analysing these clashes and the media and public 
response to them, Cohen developed a social theory of moral 
panic comprising five sequential stages:
1.	 An event, condition, episode or someone is defined as 
a threat to the values, safety and interest of the wider 
society. 
2.	 The media then amplifies these apparent threats through 
inflammatory rhetoric These portrayals appeal to public 
prejudices, creating villains in need of social control (folk 
devils) and victims (the moral majority).
3.	 The publicity surrounding the threat creates a sense of 
social anxiety leading to a public outpouring of concern.
4.	 Government then responds to the public outcry and 
frames the alleged threat as being symptomatic of a wider 
social malaise that must be addressed.
5.	 The moral panic and the responses to it transform the 
regulation of economy and society with the aim of 
tempering public outrage.
The moral panic Cohen describes appears more 
characteristic of a form of government in which sovereign 
power was of central importance; the need for action to 
address the threat to social order, the way the response to 
the moral panic transforms the regulation of society and the 
emphasis on these folk devils needing social control. There is 
an intention to contain and suppress the transgressors. It is 
also a moral panic in which the “folk devils” are not seen as 
active agents beyond their initial transgressions. 
Since its original formulation the concept of moral panics 
has developed with recent approaches subsuming the concept 
within a wider theory of moral regulation where moral panics 
are viewed as amplified and volatile expressions of temporary 
ruptures which occur when the routine processes of moral 
regulation fail.15 This is a formulation of moral panic that is 
consistent with governmentality, when sovereign power is not 
needed but routine disciplinary power does not quite seem to 
be enough invoking a moral panic is sufficient to bring things 
back under control. 
The moral panic that most preoccupies public health today 
is one about obesity,16 often inaccurately characterised as “a 
disease of affluence.” This moral panic is different to the panic 
of the 1960s. These differences are best examined using the 
insights of governmentality and of risk society.
Obesity and the Body Politic
The World Health Organization (WHO) definition of obesity 
is, “abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that presents a 
risk to health.” Obesity is identified within the health service 
via the use of a widely disseminated measure, body mass 
index (BMI). BMI is a calculation based on the relationship 
between height and weight. It will indicate to you, or to your 
doctor, if you are underweight, healthy weight, overweight, or 
obese. Obesity then is used as a signifier of a heightened risk 
of morbidity and of a premature death. It is also an indicator 
that you are likely to have a greater need for healthcare now 
and particularly in the future. 
Rates of obesity are increasing globally and the ‘obesity 
epidemic’ is characterized as one of the gravest threats to 
individual and public health of our times.17 Public discourse 
around obesity displays many of the hallmarks of a moral panic. 
Those who are labeled obese are demonized in the media as 
immoral ‘folk devils’ (literally ‘fat devils’) who violate societal 
values of self-control and who place an avoidable economic 
burden on national health systems. Pressures to obtain the 
right body size or shape carries moral connotations which 
negatively frame those as being overweight or obese as being 
slothful, lacking self-control and gluttonous. The obesity 
epidemic is linked with broader political anxieties, poor levels 
of national fitness and the discomfort of the United Kingdom 
being seen as “the fat man of Europe” for exampe.16 
Obesity prevention mass media campaigns (eg, Strong4Life in 
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the United States, Change4Life in the United Kingdom, 
and Swap it, don’t stop it in Australia) predominantly frame 
obesity as an issue of personal responsibility – arising from 
poor individual choices – which can be fixed by individuals 
taking personal responsibility for weight loss through making 
better lifestyle choices. 
But whereas in Cohen’s example the folk devils were a very 
small group of people the obese are not! In all but one of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries plus the US people categorized as obese 
make up more than a fifth of the adult population (in the 
United States more than a third) and average adult BMI is 
higher than that identified as normal (Japan is the exception in 
both cases). Thus, the average adult is, at least, overweight.18,19
In this scenario where folk devils constitute a very 
significant proportion of the population and where, unlike 
the mods and rockers, they are not breaking the law, Cohen’s 
five sequential stages of the manifestation of a moral panic 
need modification. Rose8 has suggested a number of areas that 
illuminate how problems arise and are responded to in the 
context of governmentality. Table 1 captures a series of steps 
that shape the way obesity has become an issue of concern, 
in so doing it illustrates how this moral panic occurs in the 
context of governmentality.
Social Science Weighs In
There is intense critique within the medical sociology and 
‘Fat Studies’ literature with regards to the assumed objectivity 
and neutrality of epidemiological science and its apocalyptic 
predictions around the so called ‘obesity epidemic.’5,20-23 
This literature also highlights the creation of new moral 
panics around ‘classed’ demographics of fatness based 
on geographical location and social background, around 
“communities of color”22 and especially the moralisation 
around childhood obesity – which it is argued, serves as a 
vehicle for the victim – blaming of working-class mothers.24 
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that the dominant 
obesity discourse with its emphasis on individual moral 
responsibility and personal lifestyle modification, ignores 
biological, social and structural contexts. Between 40%-
70% of body weight variance is inherited, with more than 
200 genes influencing weight and fat distribution.25,26 There 
are influences that come from endocrine disruptors, from 
the effects of sleep debt, smoking cessation and from the 
side effects of prescribed medications.27 Obesity also follows 
social gradients in wealth and inequality28 and is influenced 
by ‘obesogenic’ environmental factors such as poor access to 
healthy food outlets, a high density of fast food restaurants 
and a lack of open space for exercise.29 There is also the impact 
Table 1. Governmentality and the Moral Panic Around Obesity
How Problems Arise and Are Responded to Obesity as the Issue and the Obese as the Problem
Problematization:
•	 How did this problem emerge and what concerns is 
it in relationship to?
•	 Who defines it as a problem?
•	 How are people with this problem differentiated 
from those who do not have it?
The issue emerged as non-communicable diseases assumed a priority in public health
Obesity was defined as a problem because of a link made between it and some major non-
communicable diseases.
People are differentiated by BMI – a measure that identifies who is seen as having a healthy 
weight and who is identified as at risk. 
Explanation:
•	 What is the language used to explain? 
•	 What is considered to be evidence?
•	 What sorts of visibility is conferred? 
There are competing discourses:
Obesity as an individual responsibility indicating a lack of control, a moral failing. 
(a) Obesity as a social issue either as a manifestation of a particular modernity or as an 
outcome of living in an obesogenic environment.
Evidence of obesity is linked to an easily arrived at measure (BMI). 
Obesity is a health and an aesthetic construct – there is a “desirable” body size and shape 
promoted by the media as well as by health experts. 
Technologies:
•	 What tests are used?
•	 What are the techniques of reformation and cure 
invoked?
•	 How will these be enacted?
Measurement and location on a continuum – with the centre of that continuum being the 
desired location.
Reformation and cure are linked to individuals modifying their behaviour – eating healthy 
foods and exercising. This ostensibly will be achieved by advice and persuasion, but in 
practice the mechanism for change relies on seeking to label those resistant to change as 
morally failing. 
There is also a discourse that identifies social context, this prompts more sovereign power 
opportunities – tax/ prohibitions/zoning/not giving planning permissions for fast-food outlets 
etc. 
Authorities: 
•	 Who is considered to have expertise? 
•	 Who maintains authority in this area? 
Psychologists and behavioural economists.
Doctors and nurses, with inputs from dieticians.
Public health practitioners (town planners and urban geographers) when social dimensions 
are engaged. 
Subjectivities: 
•	 What kind are we trying to foster/create? 
The health identity: virtuous, wise, moderate. 
The aspirational aesthetic: slim and therefore attractive, desirable.
Strategies:
•	 What is the governmental aspiration here?
“Prevention of degeneration, eugenic maximisation of the fitness of the race, minimisation 
of the cost of social maladjustment.”8 Also seeking to foster the conformity of the population 
through the instructional example of the misery of the folk devils.
Abbreviation: BMI, body mass index.
Note: Left column adapted from Rose.8
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of the vested interests of food and drink industries manifest in 
advertising strategies and in lobbying activity. 
LeBesco30 claims that the new wave public health 
approaches to obesity are concomitant with the shift to a 
neoliberal form of governmentality which normalises certain 
kinds of bodies under a gaze that constantly keeps deviance 
under surveillance. Here population statistics function to 
measure and classify obesity as a type of unhealthy deviance 
from the norm which is subsequently deemed as a threat to 
society. Hence citizens are expected to “locate themselves 
within the BMI scale, to confess being fat and to seek the 
appropriate bodily discipline (diet and exercise) to avoid 
becoming an economic burden for society.”30 A discourse that 
associates weight with illness and promotes individual moral 
responsibility fosters the internalisation of weight-based 
stigma, engenders negative emotions of guilt, shame and 
anxiety for those who do not meet socially acceptable weight 
benchmarks31 and attracts other non-weight stigma identities 
including being morally flawed and being inconsiderate.3 
Moreover, numerous empirical studies demonstrate that 
obesity stigma is ineffective in reducing the incidence of 
obesity as it acts as a stressor which promotes weight gain, 
has deleterious consequences for mental health (depression 
anxiety, body dysmorphia), is associated with a range of 
physical health issues and serves to deepen existing structural 
inequalities.31-33
Moving from sovereign to disciplinary power in public 
health, changes the repertoire of techniques at its disposal. 
We can see a shift in emphasis from large scale public works, 
via the use of the law to the now fashionable idea of nudging 
people to change.34 Nudge is a behavioural economic approach, 
one of a number that have become increasingly influential in 
public health as tools for influencing behavior change and 
encouraging ‘better’ choices. The approach is based on the 
somewhat oxymoronic notion of “libertarian paternalism” 
– a new branch of neoliberal governmentality.35 It assumes 
that policy-makers should not deny people options but that 
they should consider manipulating the choice architecture 
to promote “better” choices. Examples include: provision 
of information – calorie counts on menus, and changes to 
the default option – salad rather than chips. Nudge both 
individualises understandings of choice in relation to health 
and fosters paternalism in pre-setting the choice architecture. 
Its use augments and in some cases replaces a range of other 
techniques: 
•	 Hugs: financial incentives such as vouchers in exchange 
for healthy behavior.
•	 Shoves: measures that restrict choice, like increasing the 
price of cigarettes or limiting takeaways and fast food 
outlets near schools.
•	 Smacks: Bans, such as the restriction on smoking in 
public places. 
Disciplinary Power Does not Eliminate Agency 
While Cohen’s mods and rockers may have manifest personal 
and group agency as they clashed on the beaches the ensuing 
moral panic, and the use of sovereign power, did not allow for 
their continuing to have an active role. But disciplinary power 
generates resistance, marginalised groups seek to oppose 
dominant narratives and to offer alternatives. These efforts 
are opposed and their resonance is diminished by their being 
characterised as “special cases” but, over time, solidarities can 
emerge and counter narratives can be offered and sustained.7 
This is a process that is evident in relation to obesity and is 
summarised in Table 2.
The invocation of disciplinary power also relies on the 
communication of messages, but there is a paradox in that 
those who frame the message are not always in control of 
Table 2. Where There Is Power, There Is Resistance
Elements That Can Be Challenged in the 
Exercise of Disciplinary Power The Discursive Resistance of The Marginalised
Problematization/ technologies:
•	 Against the dominant discourse
•	 Against prevailing classifications/
measurement
Against the discursive association of body size as a proxy for health. Against diet/exercise “choices” as 
explanations for trends in obesity.
Critical of the “artifactually constructed” idea that you use BMI to measure adiposity, you link excess deaths 
with high BMI and that you define high, normal and low according to the characteristic bell curve of BMI 
scores.36 
Explanations:
•	 Challenging “accepted” evidence
•	 Deconstructing motivations 
Questioning the assumed connections of body size and health and the effectiveness of strategies to reduce 
obesity that target behaviour change in those identified as most at risk of adverse health impacts.
Ask “who benefits from the prevailing obesity discourse” and “who benefits from the creation and maintenance 
of an obesogenic environment?” The former privileges the profession of medicine and the latter requires 
scrutinising the profit motive in the producers and distributors of “fast food” and other high calorie/high sugar 
food and drink. 
Authorities/subjectivities
Critical of using medical terms to classify body size. In the same way as other oppressed groups have questioned 
terminologies defined by authorities external to the affected group (eg, homosexual) so obesity, it is argued, 
can be replaced by “fat,” see the Fat Underground, the Fat Liberation Manifesto and including the scholarship 
presented in the journal “Fat Studies.”37 The argument is that both a critical examination of societal attitudes 
about body weight and appearance and advocating for equality for all people irrespective of body size are 
needed. 
Strategies
Opposing the use of stigma as a deliberate policy to encourage weight loss.
Creating solidarities of the marginalised to challenge the dominant discourse instead of isolating and 
individualising them. 
Abbreviation: BMI, body mass index.
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its communication. The media does not just communicate 
medical and scientific messages it also uses these messages 
in ways that serve the interests of the media, for example 
exaggerating the dramatic and alarmist elements of academic 
reports in ways that are believed to best satisfy its readers/
viewers.38 
Putting Governmentality, Individualised Public Health 
and Moral Panics Together 
A consequence of the increased emphasis on individual 
responsibility for ill health means that neither state, civil 
society or private sector institutions are held responsible for 
health problems. Blaming individuals and groups for the health 
needs they manifest leads to a focus on disciplinary power 
and, in so doing, ignores underlying biological and structural 
causes and puts undue and counter-productive pressure on 
the vulnerable. This is not to argue a fatalist approach where 
individuals have no agency or self-determination in relation 
to maintaining their health. But creating folk devils and 
mobilising moral panics is a risky tactic, it is something that 
might be invoked for other issues where there is a reluctance to 
use sovereign power and where governmentality is not quite 
enough. Hier39 has talked of “panic as regulation” approaches. 
These sorts of issues are vulnerable to appropriation by right 
wing populism. Here health fears are politicised, simplified, 
and made spectacular, for example over immigrants accessing 
healthcare, or fears over malign experts in pocket to big 
Pharma promoting dangerous vaccination on a vulnerable 
populous.40-42 Fuelling moral panics and creating folk devils are 
blunt public health tools with the potential for consequences 
that bludgeon the vulnerable.
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